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EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION TO AWARD ALIMONY
Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -, 439 P.2d 679,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
The Mizners lived in California from the time of their marriage in
1947 until their separation in 1965. The husband then moved to
Nevada and in 1966 commenced divorce proceedings. Before any decree
was entered in that suit, his wife commenced divorce and support
proceedings in California with personal service of process on Mr.
Mizner at his home in Reno, Nevada. By California statute,' such
service of process gives the court in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident if he was a domiciliary2 when the cause of action arose. The
husband made no appearance in the California action. The wife was
awarded an interlocutory judgment of divorce,3 certain California
1. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 412 (Deering Supp. 1969) provides for service by publication
if the person resides out of state. Section 413 says that, when publication is appropriate,
personal service of a copy of the summons and complaint is equivalent to publication.
And Section 417 provides:
Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is outside of this State by publica-
tion of summons in accordance with Sections 412 and 413, the court shall have the
power to render a personal judgment against such person only if he was personally
served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and was a resident of this State
(a) at the time of the commencement of the action, or (b) at the time the cause of
action arose, or (c) at the time of service.
2. The California court has interpreted "resident" in CAL. CrV. PRO. CODE § 417 (Deering
1959) to mean "domicilliary." Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921
(1959); Hartford v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956); Smith v. Smith,
45 Cal. 2d 235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955).
3. "[Interlocutory decree [of divorce] does not sever the marital bonds. It is merely a
declaration that one of the spouses has at that time established a right to a final de-
cree . J. ." Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250, 252, 165 P. 706, 707 (1917). "The inter-
locutory decree does not forbid a remarriage; it simply refrains from dissolving the exist-
ing one." Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 165 Cal. App. 2d 474, 475, 332 P.2d 397, 398 (1958).
"The marital relationship is severable from the property rights which it creates; and final
settlement of the relationship should not be dependent upon final settlement of corollary
property interests." Hull v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 139, 147, 352 P.2d 161, 165, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6 (1960). For the effect of interlocutory decrees of divorce on property settlements,
see Note, Interlocutory Decrees of Divorce, 56 COLUm. L. RiEv. 228, 236-42 (1956).
A final decree of divorce may be entered one year after service of process in the original
suit upon motion of either party or by the court on its own motion. CAL. CIV. CODE § 132
(Deering Supp. 1969). A final decree of divorce may be denied if the parties are no longer
entitled to dissolution of the marriage because of condonation, O'Connell v. Superior
Court, 74 Cal. App. 350, 240 P. 294 (1925), or reconciliation, Olson v. Superior Court, 170
Cal. 250, 165 P. 706 (1917), or if the parties were not entitled to the dissolution of the
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property, and alimony by the California court. She then appeared in
the husband's divorce proceeding in Nevada and moved for partial
summary judgment asserting that that part of the California decree
granting alimony was a final judgment rendered with in personam
jurisdiction and hence entitled to full faith and credit in the Nevada
proceeding. Her motion was granted. On appeal the Nevada Supreme
Court held that the California court had acquired in personam juris-
diction over the husband and that the alimony decree was entitled to
full faith and credit.4
To determine whether a forum court can obtain in personam jur-
isdiction over an absent non-domiciliary by extraterritorial personal
service of process, the Nevada court fashioned the following test: (1)
the forum state must have a statute authorizing extraterritorial service
of process; and (2) the defendant must have certain minimum contacts
with the forum state which are relevant to the cause of action.
In compliance with the Nevada Court's test, service of process in the
wife's California proceeding had been made pursuant to statutes which
were applicable in divorce and alimony actions. Sections 412 and 413
of the Civil Procedure Code provide for service of process by publica-
tion if the defendant can not be located within the state. In con-
junction with service by publication, Section 417 provides that if the
person is personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint
and he was a domiciliary when the cause of action arose, in personam
jurisdiction over the person is acquired. Hence, Section 417 is crucial
to secure in personam jurisdiction over a husband who commits acts
giving rise to a cause of action for divorce and alimony while he is
domiciled in the forum state. If he should later desert the wife, she can
assert that he was a domiciliary when the cause of action arose.
Illinois and Kansas are two other states that have similarly extended
personal jurisdiction to solve the problem of support for the deserted
wife. The Illinois statute provides that "[w]ith respect to actions of
divorce and separate maintenance, the maintenance in the State of a
matrimonial domicile at the time the cause of action arose or the com-
mission in this State of any act giving rise to the cause of action" will
marriage in the first instance, Carp v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 481, 245 P. 459 (1926),
or, in the court's discretion, if the marriage has been dissolved by the death of one or both
parties; Gloyd v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 39, 185 P. 995 (1919).
4. Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. -, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
5. See note I supra.
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subject the absent person to in personam jurisdiction. 6 The Illinois
statute provides the same result as in Mizner, but it does recognize the
peculiar situation of divorce by providing for it in a separate sub-
section and explicitly requiring the marital domicile to be in Illinois.
In contrast, the Kansas statute is broader and relies on the marital
relationship and the plaintiff's continued residence in the state in
order to grant an in personam judgment against an absent spouse.
Specifically it provides for in personam jurisdiction over a person "liv-
ing in the marital relationship within the state notwithstanding sub-
sequent departure from the state, as to all obligations arising for
alimony.., if the other party to the marital relationship continues to
reside in the state."'7 Under such a statute with jurisdiction depending
on "living in the marital relationship within the state" and the plain-
tiff continuing to reside in the state, the problems of divisible divorce
may be eliminated.8 Essential to the doctrine of divisible divorce is the
fact that the divorce ordering state does not have in personam juris-
diction over the absent spouse and hence can not affect her support
rights.9 With the Kansas statute, if the wife can show that she is a
Kansas domiciliary entitled to a divorce, she will probably also be able
to acquire in personam jurisdiction over the absent husband and a
valid support decree.
Similar to the far reaching Kansas provision is the New York case of
Venizelos v. Venizelos'° in which the parties were married in New York
and maintained their marital domicile there for nine years until the
husband returned to his native Greece. The wife then brought a
separation action and the husband was personally served with process
in Greece. While the court disposed of the husband's objection to
jurisdiction on grounds of waiver, it also said,
Whether defendant was a domiciliary of New York or not at the
time of commencement of this action, it is our opinion that his
6. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1968). See also Friedman, Extension
of the Illinois Long Arm Statute: Divorce and Separate Maintenance, 16 DE PAUL L. REV.
45 (1966).
7. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-508(b)(6) (1964).
8. See Foowks & Harvey, The New Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, 36 F.R.D. 51, 61
(1965).
9. See generally Krauskopf, Divisible Divorce and Rights to Support, Property and
Custody, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 846 (1963); Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1233
(1963).
10. 30 App. Div. 2d 856, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1968).
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contacts with this State and the interests of New York in the liti-
gation are sufficient to subject him, under the appropriate statutes,
to the jurisdiction of our courts in an action for separation. 1
Under this analysis there seems to be no reason to base jurisdiction
on domicile in marital related causes of action. The state in which the
cause of action arises is always able to award satisfactory relief if the
offending spouse departs.
In Loeb v. Loeb12 the wife was a New York domiciliary but the
parties were married in Connecticut. After the husband obtained a
Nevada ex parte divorce the wife became a New York domiciliary and
sued for a support order. She claimed that the prior Nevada decree,
obtained without jurisdiction over her, could not affect her support
rights under New York law. But the New York Court held that its law' a
applied only to "New York wives" and that she had to establish "domi-
cile" in New York prior to the Nevada decree. The court then retreated
somewhat from use of domicile to narrow the protection afforded by
its support law saying that "it seems abundantly clear that plaintiff
had no contact with New York at any time during the period of their
marriage...." 14 This statement by the Court of Appeals seems to lend
support to the Venizelos court's opinion that domicile is not the con-
trolling jurisdictional concept in these matters. Indeed, the court seems
to recognize that the interests of the forum state that need to be
protected in the domestic relations area are often defeated by the con-
cept of domicile.
To say that the forum state would most likely be the domicile of the
departing spouse as well as the marital domicile begs the question of
what should be a proper basis for jurisdiction. In a situation in which
domicile is an inadequate concept to deal with absent spouses, the
solution cannot be phrased in its useless rubric. Indeed the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflicts'5 approves extension of jurisdiction over
absent spouses and does not hamstring itself by then relying on a find-
ing of domicile as the necessary nexus to the forum state. The Restate-
ment would sanction in personam jurisdiction over any person who
11. Id. at -, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
12. 4 N.Y.2d 542, 152 N.E.2d 36, 176 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913
(1959)
13. NY. Dox. REL. § 236 (MKinney Supp. 1968).
II. Loeb v. Loeb, 4 N.Y.2d 542, 549, 152 N.E.2d 36, 39, 176 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594 (1958),
ceit. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 24, comment b (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
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had "relationships to the state which make the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction reasonable."' 16
The Supreme Court and commentators have given much attention
to the proper basis for exercising jurisdiction. Based on an analysis of
the Court's decisions on in personam jurisdiction,'1 the due process
requirement that long arm jurisdiction not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" has been said to be a two level re-
quirement of fairness.' 8 First there must be a meaningful connection
between the person and the forum state. Secondly, the person's contact
with the forum state must relate to the suit, and the forum state must
have an interest in the suit as well as be a convenient forum for the
litigation. The commentators'9 have emphasized reasonableness, con-
venience, legitimate state interests, reasonable contacts, and the nature
of the controversy in determining a basis for jurisdiction. The decision
in Mizner comports well with these considerations because of the con-
currence of two facts in the forum state: (1) the cause of action arose
from facts that established substantive contacts with the forum; and
(2) the forum state was the matrimonial domicile.20
Even if a statute authorizes extraterritorial service of process, the
statute must still comply with due process requirements. The usual test
of the reasonableness of such a statute is phrased in the "minimum con-
tacts" language of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.2' The ma-
jority of the Nevada Supreme Court deferred to the California court
16. Id. at § 27(I)(k).
17. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 341 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 310 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945).
18. See Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Substantive Due Process Requirement,
13 KAN. L. REv. 554, 561-62 (1965).
19. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Friedman, supra note 6; Von Mehren
9: Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. Rlv. 1121
(1966); note 15 supra.
20. Matrimonial domicile has been variously defined as "the common domicile of
both spouses," R. L'L", AMEucAN' CoNFriars LAw § 11 at 22 (1968), "where the couple
lived as husband and wife," Krauskopf supra note 9 at 353, "the place of their abode
with intention of continuance," In re Estate of Smidt, 162 Misc. 596, 599, 295 N.Y.S. 227,
230 (Sur. Ct. 1937), and "the last state in which the couple lived as man [sic] and wife,"
Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1233 n.6 (1963).
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). "[D]ue process requires only that in order to be subject to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316.
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for its interpretation of the constitutionality of Section 417. In Owens
v. Superior Court22 Justice Traynor, speaking for the court, said, "The
rationale of the International Shoe case is not limited to foreign corpo-
rations, and both its language and the cases sustaining jurisdiction over
non-resident motorists make clear that the minimum contacts test for
jurisdiction applies to individuals as well as foreign corporations." 23
In Soule v. Soule,24 the California District Court of Appeal followed
the Owens decision on the constitutionality of Section 417 and applied
it in a case much like Mizner. In Soule the parties were domiciled in
California before the husband deserted to Montana. The wife, pur-
suant to Section 417, obtained a judgment of alimony against the absent
spouse. The California court held that the extension of in personam
jurisdiction was valid. Justice Collins, dissenting in Mlizner, said that
Soule was not in point because the wife did not try to enforce her award
outside of California.2 5 Such a case, the dissent argues, would dearly
prevent the full faith and credit issue which could only be authorita-
tively determined by the United States Supreme Court. He argues that
the Nevada Court is not bound by California's own determination of
its jurisdiction and distinguishes cases in which jurisdiction is extended
in order to reach non-resident tortfeasors. In such cases, the liability
once determined is not subject to modification as is true of support
decrees. Justice Collins declared that that distinction gives rise to a
"different substantive due process jurisdictional requirement."26
The other dissent in Mizner, in addition to questioning the validity
of subjecting the absent spouse to jurisdiction for future modifications
of a support decree, argues that the minimum contacts doctrine is not
applicable to the domestic relations area. As support for this proposi-
tion, justice Batjer relies on the child custody cases of New York ex rel.
Halvey v. Halvey 27 and May v. Anderson.28 But it seems clear that child
custody cases present different interests than those present in the Mizner
and Venizelos cases. Mr. Mizner had actual notice of the California
proceeding, and it can be presumed that he chose to forego an appear-
ance to protect his rights. In child custody cases there is at least this
22. 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959).
23. Id. at 831, 345, P.2d at 924-25.
24. 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962).
25. Mizner v. Mizner, - Nev. , , 439 P.2d 679, 682 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
26. Id. at 683.
27. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
28. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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personal interest of the absent spouse present plus the special state
interest in protecting the welfare of its minor children.
The Mizner case presents solutions to' two problems which have
arisen in the area of domestic relations due to outdated concepts of
jurisdiction. New long arm statutes can effectively provide an alterna-
tive to divisible divorce in order to obtain support for an absent spouse.
If states would adopt long arm provisions similar to the Kansas statute,
"divisible divorce" may become the epitaph of a period of transition
in in personam jurisdiction from domicile to reasonableness.
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